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REGULATION OF BARBERS
A CASE STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-
THE REGULATION OF BARBERS
DAVID FELLMANt
The problems presented by the regulation of what is generally
considered a rather simple trade are not at all simple. Although
it is now a truism to say that we live in an age of increasing
public regulation of many aspects of our social, occupational and
personal lives, and although the power of government to pro-
mulgate rules and establish standards in the interests of the
general welfare is, generally speaking, well established, any par-
ticular field of activity will, upon close examination, suggest
many interesting and significant problems. General questions
of constitutional right arise, such as are measured by the reason-
ableness which due process and the equal protection of the law
require. And many problems of an administrative character,
dealing with the discretionary authority of enforcement agencies
and the fairness of their procedural techniques, are brought be-
fore the courts for review.
The aim of this paper is to examine these various issues in
detail through an exhaustive analysis of a single, garden-
variety trade, that of the barber. This is a case study, and it
was undertaken in the hope that a vertical approach to the law
of licensing will illuminate the many aspects of a body of law
which has generally been treated horizontally and in rather gen-
eral terms. Many of the legal problems of the barber are quite
typical of the service trades, although it will appear that some
of them are rather peculiar to this particular trade. The illus-
tration of general principles as well as the exploration of special
issues must be the objectives of any such case study.
The barbering trade has been closely regulated for many years.
Issues arising from its regulation have been raised in the courts
many times. The regulation of barbers is the object of a great
deal of legislative activity today, and the legislatures are push-
ing their rules into the borderline regions of constitutionality
and policy. A study of this trade, therefore, has a foundation
of varied and fruitful experience, and affords the investigator
the possibility of noting tendencies and making generalizations.
t Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska.
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An analysis of this trade will also suggest the nature of the
fundamental interests which lie at the base of the existing body
of licensing regulations. On the one hand, there is the important
and compelling interest of conserving the public health and pro-
moting the general welfare. But it will also appear that here,
as is so frequently the case today, an important impetus for legis-
lation comes from the organized barbers themselves. They come
to the legislatures, local councils, and administrative boards seek-
ing such economic satisfactions as the curtailment of competi-
tion through the restriction of opportunities to enter the trade,
price-fixing, and similar devices. Equally important is the fact
that they also seek the social and psychological satisfactions
which they think will come from elevating a humble and honor-
able trade into a profession, replete with examinations, stand-
ards, boards, and a terminology smacking of the scientific. Regu-
lation is not merely a matter of external restraint; it is also a
product of the group quest for status and security. The assertion
of integrated group interests is a characteristic feature of our
times.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER
There is a vast amount of legislation on the statute books of
forty-six states and the District of Columbia dealing with the
licensing and regulation of barbers.1 Although this body of legis-
1. D. C. (1938) 52 Stat. 620; Ala. Gen. Acts (1935) No. 316, Acts Extra
Sess. 1936, 71; Ariz. Sess. Laws of 1935, c. 51, Laws of 1939, c. 38; Ark.
Pope's Dig. Stat. (1937) secs. 12069-12091, Laws of 1939, Act 198; Cal.
Deering's Gen. Laws (1937) Act 665, Deering's Codes (1935 Supp.) Act
8780f; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 19, Laws of 1937, c. 105; Conn. Supp.
Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) secs. 1193e-1208c; Del. Rev. Code (1935) sees.
1030-1043, Laws of 1937, c. 184; Fla. Gen. Laws (1931) 23, Gen. Laws
(1935) 91, c. 16799; Ga. Code (1933) c. 84-4, as amended, Laws of 1937,
564; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) sees. 53-601 to 705, as amended, Laws of
1935, c. 28, Laws of 1939, c. 29; Ill. Laws of 1937, 252, as amended, Laws
of 1939, 298, 303; Ind. Burns Stat. Ann. (1933) sees. 63-301 to 327, as
amended, Acts of 1937, c. 65, Acts of 1939, c. 108; Iowa Code (1935) sees.
2585-bil to b19, sees. 5786-gl to g8; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) secs.
65-1801 to 1807, sees. 74-1801 to 1804; Ky. Acts of 1938, c. 44; La. Dart's
Gen. Stat. Ann. (1939) sees. 9367-9389.15; Me. Laws of 1937, c. 190; Md.
Flack's Supp. Ann. Code (1935) art. 43, sees. 269-282-0; Mass. Michie
Ann. Laws (1933) c. 112, sees. 87F to 87S, e. 13, sees. 39-41, 1938 Cum.
Supp., c. 112, sees. 87F-87R, c. 13, sees. 40-41; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
sees. 8691-8714, as amended, Mason's Code (1933 Supp.) sees. 8700-8711-5,
as amended, Pub. Acts of 1937, No. 307; Minn. Mason's Stat. (1938 Supp.)
sees. 5846-1 to 26'A; Miss. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 118, as amended, Laws of
1938, c. 176; R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 13522-13534, as amended, Gillespie's
Cum. Ann. Supp. (1937) sees. 13522-13529; Mont. Laws of 1939, c. 150;
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) sees. 71-2001 to 71-2027, as amended, Comp. Stat.
(Supp. 1937) sees. 71-2020 to 71-2023; Nev. Hillyer's Comp. Laws (1929)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/1
REGULATION OF BARBERS
lation has been built up over a long period of time, most of the
general laws have been enacted or over-hauled during the past
decade. These laws follow a common pattern, but taken as a
whole, they include a bewildering variety of rules, regulations,
and systems of administration.
The constitutional power of a state to regulate the barber
trade is now well established. The courts agree upon the in-
herently useful, necessary, and beneficial character of the trade;
the barber "has come to be recognized as an artisan, indispens-
able and respected as the time-honored butcher and baker and
candlestick maker." But the police power extends "to all the
great public needs,"'3 and the courts now universally admit the
validity of licensing laws regulating the barbering trade as serv-
ing the interests of the public health.4 Just how this legislation
sees. 760-785, as amended, Hillyer's Comp. Laws (1938 Supp.) sees. 760-
779, and Stat. (1939) c. 188; N. H. Laws of 1937, c. 163; N. J. Laws of
1938, c. 197; N. M. Laws of 1935, c. 111; N. C. Michie Code Ann. (1931)
sees. 5003 (a)-(x), as amended, Pub. Laws of 1937, c. 138, and Pub. Laws
of 1939, c. 164; N. D. Laws of 1927, c. 101, as amended, Laws of 1931,
cc. 97, 98, 99, Laws of 1933, c. 79; Ohio Page's Gen. Code (1937) sees.
1081-1081-27; Okla. Stats. (1931) sees. 4325-4352, as amended, Laws of
1933, c. 60, Laws of 1936-7, c. 24, arts. 2, 3; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) sees.
68-401 to 425, as amended, Code Ann. (1935 Supp.) sees. 68-401 to 426,
and Laws (1939) c. 540; Pa. Purdon's Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 63, sees. 551-
567; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 262; S. C. Acts of 1937, No. 223; S. D.
Code (1939) c. 27.16; Tenn. Williams Code (1932) sees. 7117-7139, Pub.
Acts of 1937, c. 236; Tex. Vernon's Ann. Penal Code (1936) art. 728-
734a; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) sees. 79-4-1 to 79-4-19, sees. 79-1-5 (3);
Vt. Laws of 1937, No. 195; Wash. Remington's Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) sees.
8277-1 to 19, as amended, Laws of 1937, c. 199; W. Va. Acts of 1939, c.
30; Wis. Stats. (1937) c. 158; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1931) sees. 11-101
to 123, as amended, Laws of 1935, cc. 7, 8, 9, Laws of 1937, c. 67. There
are no general state barber laws in New York and Virginia; here the
impetus of regulation comes from the local governments. These citations
will not be repeated in the discussion except where there is special need.
Instead, reference will be made to the names of the states.
2. People v. Stiegler (County Ct. 1936) 160 Misc. 463, 290 N. Y. S. 732,
733.
3. Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 111.
4. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 397; Eason
v. Morrison (1935) 181 Ga. 322, 182 S. E. 163; People v. Logan (1918)
284 Ill. 83, 119 N. E. 913; Commonwealth v. Ward (1909) 136 Ky. 146,
123 S. W. 673; State v. Zeno (1900) 79 Minn. 80, 81 N. W. 748, 48 L. R. A.
88, 79 Am. St. Rep. 422; Clark v. State (1934) 169 Miss. 369, 152 So.
820; Ex parte Lucas (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218; State v. Lockey
(1930) 198 N. C. 551, 152 S. E. 693; Peters v. State (Okla. Crhn. App.
1934) 34 P. (2d) 286; Mundell v. Graph (1934) 62 S. D. 631, 256 N. W.
121; State Board of Examiners v. Comer (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 109 S. W.
(2d) 1012; State v. Sharpless (1903) 31 Wash. 191, 71 Pac. 737, 96 Am.
St. Rep. 893; State v. Walker (1907) 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775, 15 Ann. Cas.
257; McDermott v. State (Wash. 1938) 84 P. (2d) 372. See Note (1940)
26 Va. L. Rev. 928.
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protects and promotes the public health has been elaborated over
and over again by the judges. Briefly, the argument is that the
barber comes into close physical contact with his customers, often
with sharp instruments, and that there is therefore need for
special safeguards with respect to skill and sanitation. Such
being the case, "it goes without saying that barbering requires
a degree of skill, proficiency, and training."5 Of course, there
are other trades which require skill and training, but the particu-
lar feature of this one which justifies the amount of regulation
now enforced is the element of physical contact with the public.
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in upholding the
recent state barber act,6 explained away a previous case holding
a similar act for the plumber unconstitutional7 on the ground
that the latter's trade does not involve this element. It is further
argued that the emphasis upon cleanliness and sanitation as a
public health measure is in accord with the general trend of
modern legislation. "Why go back," it is asked, "to the standard
of the discredited barber who would use the same old towel on
the face of every customer from Monday morning until Saturday
night?18 The barber must, by the compulsion of law if neces-
sary, keep pace with the times.
II. REGULATION BY MUNICIPALITIES
A great many of the regulations dealing with barbers are
found in municipal ordinances, which form part of the health
codes of many localities. There is no doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of delegating to municipalities the power to regulate
this trade.9 Furthermore, it has been held that a state barber
law which is applicable in a given town only with the approval
of the town council is consistent with the rule of delegation of
power, the court comparing this procedure to familiar local op-
tion liquor laws.10
5. State v. Lockey (1930) 198 N. C. 551, 152 S. E. 693, 696.
6. Beaty v. Humphrey (Ark. 1938) 115 S. W. (2d) 559.
7. Replogle v. Little Rock (1924) 166 Ark. 617, 267 S. W. 353, 36
A. L. R. 1333.
8. People v. Stiegler (County Ct. 1936) 160 Misc. 463, 290 N. Y. S.
732, 735.
9. Louisville v. Schnell (1908) 131 Ky. 104, 114 S. W. 742, 40 L. R. A.(N. S.) 637. A municipality may not add to the penalties of substantive
provisions of a general state law purporting to embrace the whole subject.
State v. Paille (N. H. 1934) 9 A. (2d) 663.
10. State v. Armeno (1909) 29 R. I. 431, 72 AtI. 216.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/1
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Generally speaking, municipalities have adequate authority to
deal with this trade. A charter provision authorizing a city to
regulate and license trades, professions, occupations and callings,
for the promotion of good order, public health and safety, un-
doubtedly enables the city to regulate, by licensing and otherwise,
the barbering trade.1 The grant of power to a city board of
health to prevent the spreading of contagious diseases is ample
to enable the city to promulgate sanitary rules for barbers and
to require a license.12 A charter provision authorizing a city to
set up a board of health and to preserve the general health of
the people is broad enough for this purpose, and the fact that
the state board of health has been given the power to make rules
and regulations on the same subject does not oust the city board
of jurisdiction if its ordinance is not in conflict with the regula-
tions imposed by the state. 3
III. THE MATTER OF QUALIFICATIONS
The various requirements relating to the qualifications of bar-
bers and apprentices, fixed by statute, ordinance and administra-
tive regulation, have been tested in the courts many times. The
requirement of good moral character has been held to be a rea-
sonable one.' 4 There is no doubt of the reasonableness of requir-
ing a certificate of health, in view of the peculiarities of the
trade.15 And it has been held that it is not necessary to define,
in the statute, just which diseases are "infectious, contagious, or
communicable," since "almost every man of moderate intelli-
gence" would agree that certain diseases fall within this cate-
gory, and in doubtful cases the matter can be left to the judge
or jury. 6 Furthermore, an administrative rule requiring every
applicant for an annual renewal license to submit a laboratory
report and a physician's certificate showing freedom from in-
fectious and contagious diseases was held valid as being within
the statutory authority of the board to adopt reasonable regula-
tions, even though an annual health examination was not speci-
fied in the statute. 7 Although the statute provided that a barber,
11. Hanzal v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 221 S. W. 237.
12. La Porta v. Board of Health (1904) 71 N. J. L. 88, 58 Atl. 115.
13. Ransone v. Craft (1935) 161 Va. 332, 170 S. E. 610; Trimble v.
Topeka (1938) 147 Kan. 111, 75 P. (2d) 241.
14. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 397.
15. See cases cited supra note 4.
16. Hanzal v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 221 S. W. 237.
17. Eason v. Morrison (1935) 181 Ga. 322, 182 S. E. 163.
19411
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once licensed, does not have to requalify, the court indicated that
this had reference only to his skill, a matter having no relation
to the question of disease. Finally, it may be noted that the
inspection of shops during business hours to enforce reasonable
regulations does not violate a state constitutional provision as to
searches and seizures. 8
The courts have assumed without much question, once the
general power to regulate has been admitted, that it is proper
to require the applicant for a barber's license to pass an exami-
nation testing his skill in the handling of instruments, and his
knowledge of sanitation and other problems connected with hi
trade. This is in accord with the common law rule that barbers
must exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care, and that
they are liable for injuries to patrons resulting from negligent,
incompetent, unsanitary or careless work.19 The content of par-
ticular examinations, however, has been severely criticized by
several courts in recent years as going beyond the necessities
of the trade. For example, a barber law enacted by Maryland
a few years ago provided that the course of instruction in the
barber school or shop must include the "scientific fundamentals
for barbering, hygiene, bacteriology, histology of the hair, skin,
nails, muscles and nerves, structure of the head, face and neck,
elementary chemistry relating to sterilization and antiseptics, dis-
ease of the skin, hair, glands and nails, haircutting, shaving and
arranging, dressing, coloring, bleaching and tinting of the hair.120
The highest court of Maryland thought that these requirements
were "entirely out of proportion with the character and purposes
of this trade and with the safeguards that seem just and fair
to the public. They constitute an arbitrary prohibition rather
than a reasonable approach to a lawful and chosen work."' 21
Furthermore, the court thought that the sweeping powers given
to the board by the statute were "so broad that they may be exer-
cised in an arbitrary fashion in this almost unlimited field of
18. State ex rel. Melton v. Nolan (1930) 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. W. (2d)
601.
19. Marsteller v. S. Kann Sons & Co. (App. D. C. 1929) 32 F. (2d)
419; Reed v. Rosenthal (1929) 129 Ore. 203, 276 Pac. 684, 63 A. L. R.
1071; Smith v. York (La. App. 1934) 152 So. 152; Barnett v. Roberts
(1922) 243 Mass. 233, 137 N. E. 353; Hales v. Kerr [1908] 2 K. B. 601,
15 Ann. Cas. 448.
20. Md. Acts of 1935, c. 371, sec. 282L.
21. Schneider v. Duer (Md. 1936) 184 Atl. 914, 917.
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requirements. 22 This denunciation of the statute was premised
upon the court's conviction that "this trade is neither highly
technical nor exceptionally difficult, and its nature is understood
by persons generally * * *..,23 A similar "imposing array of
subjects" was condemned by a federal district court as being
unreasonable and unnecessary, and indefinite as to the amount
of knowledge to be acquired.24
One court has also ruled invalid a scale of grading devised by
an examining board which, in weighing the various items of the
examination, counted "haircutting" and "shaving" as 48%, the
balance including such items as "cleanliness" and "condition of
tools. ' 25 The court thought this was giving too much weight to
items which are "of only minor importance, is so far as health
and safety are concerned," since haircutting and shaving relate
merely to "style and mechanical skill," and that the system of
grading adopted was arbitrary and capricious, leaving it within
the power of the board to refuse a license arbitrarily. It has
been suggested, however, that if a board's grading plan is un-
reasonable or arbitrary, it does not follow that the law itself is
unconstitutional, the remedy being to review the conduct of the
board.26
A statutory requirement of a two years' apprenticeship before
qualifying as a barber has been upheld, the court expressing the
opinion that it did not know judicially how much time should be
required to guarantee proficiency, and that if the legislature
was wrong, relief must be sought there.2 7 Similarly, an appren-
ticeship period of three years has been approved, on the ground
that the trade requires training, experience and study,28 and
another court suggested that while "three years seems a long
time to require for learning the trade of a barber," it was not
22. Id. at 918.
23. Id. at 917.
24. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 839, com-
ment (1929) 4 Wash. L. Rev. 139. The portions of the Idaho barber law
requiring knowledge of massaging and manipulation of muscles of the upper
body and knowledge of diseases of nails were held invalid in Monte Jano v.
Rayner (D. C. Idaho 1939) 33 F. Supp. 435.
25. Timmons v. Morris (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1921) 271 Fed. 721.
26. State v. Wester (1925) 135 Wash. 32, 236 Pac. 790.
27. Moler v. Whisman (1912) 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 40 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 629, Ann. Cas. 1913D 392.
28. State v. Zeno (1900) 79 Minn. 80, 81 N. W. 748, 48 L. R. A. 88,
79 Am. St. Rep. 422.
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in a position to say that it was unreasonably long.21 However,
a statute requiring a two years' apprenticeship under a barber
was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary the court maintaining
that "what the public is interested to know is that the barber
is competent," and that whether he learns the trade as a barber's
apprentice or in a barbering school doesn't matter.30
The matter of the apprentice barber has been before the courts
in connection with other legal questions. A federal district court
recently ruled that limiting the number of apprentices to one
for each barber shop is an unreasonable and arbitrary interfer-
ence with the liberty of the citizen.a1 The court argued that the
absence of any peril to the public health is seen in the fact that
apprenticeship is expressly authorized by the legislature. The
bearing of this rule upon the public health, it was asserted, "is
so remote we are unable to see it."' , 2 It has also been decided
that a statute prohibiting more than two apprentices to a barber
shop does not apply to a barber school, even though students are
allowed, after completing their preliminary work, to receive a
nominal fee for their work, since shops and schools are men-
tioned separately in the statute, and since such a limitation on
the schools would destroy them.3 3 Some years ago the Missouri
court held that it was a denial of constitutional right to forbid
students of barbering to receive compensation, arguing that ap-
prenticeship is as old as civilization, that the prohibiton was
without precedent, and that two years of work as an apprentice
without compensation did not promote the public health.34 Just
recently the Iowa court held the same way in reference to a law
which forbade students of cosmetology from charging the public
for services rendered.3 - On the other hand, the Rhode Island
court declared constitutional a statute which provided that bar-
ber schools could not make any charge for any work done except
the tuition charge.3' The court asserted that "the proprietor of
29. People v. Logan (1918) 284 Ill. 83, 119 N. E. 913.
30. State v. Walker (1907) 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775, 15 Ann. Cas. 257.
31. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 839, 841.
32. Ibid.
33. Ramsey v. Cantrell (Tenn. 1936) 93 S. W. (2d) 632.
34. Moler v. Whisman (1912) 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 40 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 629, Ann. Cas. 1913D 392.
85. State ex rel. Mitchell v. School of Beauty Culture (Iowa 1939) 285
N. W. 133.
36. State v. Conragan (1934) 54 R. I. 256, 171 AtI. 326.
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a barber school has no more right to receive compensation for
the service performed by a student than has the student," and
that the statute was reasonable and necessary "to insure to the
public protection from untrained and unauthorized barbers. ' 37
Only one court has ruled so far on the constitutionality of a
requirement of citizenship for barbers. In 1902, the Michigan
court held such a requirement to be unconstitutional as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment 8 The court could not see how the morals, health
or even the convenience of the public were promoted by making
citizenship, as well as knowledge and skill, a prerequisite for a
barber's license. The volume of anti-alien legislation, in this and
other fields, however, is growing steadily greater, and it is to
be noted that the curtailment of the alien's opportunities of mak-
ing a living has received a great deal of judicial sanction.' 9
A federal circuit court of appeals recently held that a city
ordinance requiring a year's residence in the county before one
is eligible for a license to operate a barber shop was invalid as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws, the court ruling that
it did not promote the public health, as in the case of a physical
examination, but was merely designed to discriminate unreason-
ably in favor of local residents. 40 The court also considered the
ordinance an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, though it is difficult to see how the
right to own a barber shop is an incident of federal citizenship.41
The age requirement, found in almost all barbering statutes,
has been accepted without much protest, largely, one may sup-
pose, because it is not very restrictive, although one court, in
condemning various features of a general law, suggested that
it was not apparent that it tended to protect public health.42
37. Id., 54 R. I. at 259.
38. Templar v. State Board of Examiners (1902) 131 Mich. 254, 90
N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610.
39. See Fellman, The Alien's Right to Work (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 137.
40. New Brunswick v. Zimmerman (C. C. A. 3, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 428,
aff'g (D. C. D. N. J. 1934) 10 F. Supp. 401.
41. If, however, the unusual doctrine of Colgate v. Harvey (1935) 296
U. S. 404, is expanded in the future, one cannot predict where the privi-
leges and immunities clause may eventually lead us. The recent overruling
of the Colgate case (Madden v. Kentucky (1940) 309 U. S. 83) is reassur-
ing.
42. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 839, 841.
Rudkin, J., dissenting in State v. Walker (1907) 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775,
15 Ann. Cas. 257, argued that he could not see how the statutory provisions
as to age and character had anything to do with the public health.
19411
Washington University Open Scholarship
222 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 26
Many statutes require the applicant for a barber's license to sub-
mit one or two photographs of himself when applying, and also
to post a photograph, along with his license, in his shop. The
Washington court recently held that this was a valid regulation,
designed to safeguard the public against persons unlawfully hold-
ing themselves out to be licensees. 43 Since the tendency of this
legislation will be to protect the community against unauthorized
persons, who may be physically and morally unqualified, it has
a reasonable relationship to the public health. The court could
not agree that the use of photographs was unreasonable "because
some persons may associate rogues' gallery pictures with all
photographs used for the purpose of identification. It is a pro-
tection to the licensee himself."44
IV. PRICE FIXING
One of the most recent and serious problems arising in con-
nection with the limits of the regulatory power of the state is
that of price-fixing. A number of states have, in the past few
years, enacted statutes providing for some method of fixing mini-
mum prices specifically for barbers,45 or broader statutes apply-
ing to service trades in general, and thereafter enforced with
respect to barbers.46 These attempts to regulate the prices
charged by barbers for their services are in accord with a gen-
eral trend of our times, and have undoubtedly been stimulated,
in part at least, by recent decisions of federal courts upholding
price regulation and minimum wage legislation. 47
43. McDermott v. State (Wash. 1938) 84 P. (2d) 372.
44. Id. at 375.
45. Ariz. Laws of 1939, c. 38; Ark. Laws of 1939, Act 198; Colo. Laws of
1937, c. 105; Fla. Gen. Laws (1935) c. 16799; Ind. Acts of 1939, c. 108;
La. Acts of 1936, No. 48; Mont. Laws of 1939, c. 150, sec. 4; Okla. Laws
of 1937, c. 24, art. 2; Tenn. Acts of 1937, c. 236.
46. Ala. Gen. Acts of 1935, No. 316; Deering's Cal. Codes (1935 Supp.)
Act 8780f; Iowa Code (1935) sec. 5786-gl-8; Minn. Laws of 1937, c. 235.
47. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 420;
O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1931) 282 U. S. 251;
Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U. S. 502; Townsend v. Yeomans (1937)
301 U. S. 441; Edwards v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
767; Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 985.
See also: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S. 379; the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936)
-298 U. S. 238, 324-34. These decisions have modified the importance of
earlier cases frowning upon price-fixing for certain industries. Chas. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923) 262 U. S. 522; Tyson
& Bro. v. Banton (1927) 273 U. S. 418; Ribnik v. McBride (1928) 277
U. S. 350; Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 235.
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Since price-fixing laws for the service trades are of very recent
vintage, and to date have been adopted in only about thirteen
states,48 the number of judicial decisions on the subject, so far
as barbers are concerned, is necessarily rather small. As the
decisions now stand, the weight of authority is against the con-
stitutionality of these statutes. The highest appellate courts of
Iowa, Florida, Alabama, Indiana and Tennessee, and a District
Court of Appeal in California have, since 1936, declared such
measures invalid.4 9 On the other hand, price-fixing in this calling
has been sustained by the supreme courts of Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and Minnesota. 0 It is to be noted, however, that these
cases bear the marks of serious controversy over an issue still
in the area of conflict. In the Iowa case, three judges concurred
separately, submitting two different concurring opinions. In the
Florida case, one judge wrote a concurring opinion, and two
judges dissented. Furthermore, it may be noted that while the
Florida court held, in 1936, that price control for barbers was
invalid, in 1938 it upheld a price-fixing statute for the cleaning,
dyeing, pressing and laundry business,51 a most inconsistent posi-
tion in which the barber case was lightly brushed aside without
really being distinguished, and in which two judges dissented,
and one wrote a special concurring opinion. One judge dissented
in the Alabama case. When the Louisiana court first considered
the barber's price-fixing law it held it unconstitutional, three
judges dissenting, but on re-hearing, the statute was sustained,
with two judges dissenting. In the Oklahoma case three judges
48. Of course, similar measures are being steadily introduced in various
state legislatures.
49. Mobile v. Rouse (1937) 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266, 111 A. L. R. 349;
Ex parte Kazas (1937) 22 Cal. App. (2d) 161, 70 P. (2d) 962, followed
in In re Landowitz (1937) 22 Cal. App. (2d) 733, 71 P. (2d) 334 (bar-
bers); Ex parte Herrick (1938) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 751, 77 P. (2d) 262
(cleaning and dyeing trade) ; State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives (1936) 123 Fla.
401, 167 So. 394; Hollingsworth v. State Board of Barber Examiners (Ind.
1940) 28 N. E. (2d) 64; Duncan v. Des Moines (1936) 222 Iowa 218, 268
N. W. 547; State v. Greeson (Tenn. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d) 253.
50. Board of Examiners v. Parker (1938) 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485,
comments (1938) 1 La. L. Rev. 218 and (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 144;
Herrin v. Arnold (1938) 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977, 119 A. L. R. 1471,
comments (1938) 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 128, (1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 229, (1938)
13 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 494; State v. McMasters (Minn. 1939) 283 N. W.
767. But a barbers' association may not itself fix the prices. Ex parte
Tennyson (1938) 184 Okla. 50, 84 P. (2d) 637.
51. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board
(Fla. 1938) 183 So. 759, upholding Fla. Acts of 1937, c. 17894.
19411
Washington University Open Scholarship
224 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
dissented. Furthermore, the majority opinions, and most of the
concurring and dissenting opinions, are lengthy and argumenta-
tive. All in all, these courts have had a difficult task before them
in seeking to reconcile the individualism inherent in some estab-
lished constitutional principles with the new controls which legis-
latures are seeking to invoke.
The various price-fixing laws have a more or less common
pattern. In most cases, the fixing of rates depends upon some
prior petition or agreement of a certain percentage of the mem-
bers of the trade in a particular locality. The Boards of Barber
Examiners of Louisiana and Colorado may act on the petition
of 75% of the barbers of each judicial district; in Arizona, Okla-
homa and Montana the Board may act on the request of the same
percentage of barbers in each city or town and in Arkansas on
the request of 70%. The Minnesota law authorizes the governor
to act on the request of 65% of the members of any service trade
in any subdivision of the state. In Indiana, the board may act
on the petition of "any organized and representative group of
barbers" of any city or town, with the subsequent approval of
80% of the barbers of the locality. The Iowa law provided that
the city council could fix rates on the petition of 65% of the
owners or operators of barber shops in towns having less than
2500 inhabitants, and on the petition of 70% in towns over 2500.
The California statute authorized the governing body of any city
or county to act on the petition of 80% of the trade, while the
Alabama statute permitted cities between 60,000 and 250,000 to
fix minimum prices by ordinance on petition of 60% of the trade.
The Florida statute authorized the board to act on its own initia-
tive or on the complaint of a "representative group." The Ten-
nessee law required the petition of 75% of the barbers of each
county.
The expressed legislative purpose, as set forth in the pre-
ambles of the various statutes, takes one of two approaches. Two
of the statutes which have been sustained, those of Louisiana and
Oklahoma, are premised upon considerations of public health.
Four of the statutes which have been held unconstitutional were
based on the facts of economic emergency, unemployment, trade
disorganization and ruinous price-cutting, although the Florida
statute included the argument of public health as well. The
Tennessee statute was based largely on considerations of public
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health, as are the untested statutes of Colorado and Montana.
The Minnesota and Indiana laws embrace both types of consider-
ations.
In validating price-fixing, the courts of Louisiana, Oklahoma
and Minnesota expressed the belief that there was a reasonable
relationship between such laws and the public health. These
courts leaned heavily upon the authority of Nebbia v. New Yor
5 2
and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.53 The Oklahoma court also
ruled that the act did not involve an unlawful delegation of
powers, pointing out that there must first be an investigation by
the board, and that after the administrative order is made there
is always the possibility of a judicial inquiry into its reasonable-
ness.54 The Minnesota court ruled that the fair trade practice
act did not delegate to the governor an unfettered legislative
power.55
The five courts which have held such price-fixing statutes un-
constitutional as a denial of due process of law emphasized the
fact that while the police power is very broad, it is not without
limitation, and that the right to engage in an inherently lawful
occupation and fix the price for personal services is a property
right protected by the constitution against governmental en-
croachment. The mere fact that barbering may be subjected to
considerable regulation and licensing does not justify any and
every kind of legislation. Further, these courts argued the point
that emergency does not create power or authorize the suspen-
sion of constitutional guarantees. The Nebbia, case was distin-
guished on the ground that the industry there regulated, the milk
industry of New York, was of paramount importance in the
state, a position which the barbering trade does not occupy. The
Alabama court thus distinguished its own previous ruling with
reference to the constitutionality of its own milk control act, 6
pointing out that the milk industry is "affected with a public
interest.' ' 7 Barbering, the Supreme Court of Florida maintained,
is not a "chief industry" of the state; the general welfare and
52. (1934) 291 U. S. 502.
53. (1937) 300 U. S. 379.
54. Herrin v. Arnold (1938) 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977, 982-3.
55. State v. McMasters (Minn. 1939) 283 N. W. 767, 769.
56. Franklin v. State ex rel. Milk Control Board (1936) 232 Ala. 637,
169 So. 295.
57. Mobile v. Rouse (1937) 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266, 268, 111 A. L. R.
349.
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prosperity of the state do not depend upon it; the assumption of
its social importance "is so egregiously erroneous that its illusion
may be said to be a matter of common knowledge."r8 The court
thought that it would be easy to enumerate at least fifty voca-
tions which are as important to the state. The California District
Court of Appeals, in applying a price-fixing law in a single city,
indicated also that the barbers constituted a very small group,
with their families amounting to only two per cent of the popula-
tion, and that the statute therefore ignored the other 98%.61
In the fullest exposition of this point of view yet written, the
Florida court argued the broad principle involved at some length.
It asserted:
What this legislation undertakes is not regulation, but man-
agement, control, dictation. The Legislature may not by its
flat convert a private business into a public utility. 0
The court thought that the statute was based upon several un-
tenable assumptions, such as the notions that the standard of
living of barbers is a matter so affecting the general welfare of
all the people as to warrant making them a favored class, and
that the demoralization of the trade is due to the "cut throat"
practices of the "stronger members" of the trade. This statute,
the court asserted, represents
a species of socialistic leveling of merit or capacity in the
practitioner wholly inconsistent with the American ideal of
encouragement to the worthy and industrious, by placing a
handicap upon the proficient artist in the trade.61
Furthermore, the court thought that the statute unconstitution-
ally delegated legislative power to the board, within the rule of
the Schechter case. 62
It is also worthy of note that while the Minnesota court upheld
a price-fixing law, it was of the opinion that the law was "crudely
conceived and expressed," that there was a great difference be-
tween regulating barbers' services and milk prices, that "the
general public interest, if any, is indirect and incidental," and
that the main objective, "somewhat disguised," was the welfare
58. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives (1936) 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394, 401.
59. Ex parte Kazas (1937) 22 Cal. App. (2d) 161, 70 P. (2d) 962, 968-9.
60. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives (1936) 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394, 403.
61. Id., 107 So. at 402.
62. Schechter v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495. The Indiana deci-
sion, Hollingsworth v. Board, supra note 49, turned on the delegation of
legislative powers to private persons.
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of the trade. The court concluded its opinion with this state-
ment, which perhaps explains why it sustained the law at all:
The wisdom of such group legislation may be doubted. It
may be inimical to the best interests of the group it seeks
to favor, to say nothing of public good. But that is for the
legislature and not the courts.63
A similar type of regulation now being sought by barbers'
associations in their quest for professional status, and in their
desire to curtail price competition, is one which forbids the ad-
vertising of prices. A number of state legislatures have oblig-
ingly written into their barber laws provisions prohibiting bar-
bers from advertising prices or posting price lists which can be
seen from outside the shop.64 A California court has ruled that
this is an unconstitutional encroachment on "the right of prop-
erty and of contract," and an impairment of freedom of speech
and press.6 5 Knowledge by a customer of the price he is to pay
before entering the shop is not detrimental to the morals or
general welfare of the barber, the customer or the general public.
Furthermore, the court maintained that by singling out this par-
ticular trade the statute made an arbitrary classification. The
same conclusion was recently reached by a Delaware court, it
being suggested that "there is very little difference between a
barber advertising the price for which he sells his services to
the public, and a merchant advertising the price for which he
sells hats and shoes." 6 Similarly, a statute prohibiting the dis-
play of any sign other than "barber school" or "barber college"
by places teaching the trade has been held unconstitutional by
the Missouri court on the grounds that it was special legislation,
was no safeguard for the public health, and that it was improper
to prohibit the honest advertising of a legitimate business.67
However, a requirement that a barber college post a sign show-
63. State v. MeMasters (Minn. 1939) 283 N. W. 767, 770.
64. See: Del. Laws of 1937, c. 184; Ky. Acts of 1938, c. 44, sec. 19(f);
Mass. Cure. Supp. (1938) sec. 87K; R. I. Laws of 1936-1938, c. 2613, sec. 1;
W. Va. Acts of 1939, c. 30, sec. 9.
65. People v. Osborne (Cal. App. 1936) 59 P. (2d) 1083, comment (1937)
35 Mich. L. Rev. 488.
66. State v. Danberg (Del. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 596, 600. Accord: State v.
Garrubo (1940) 124 N. J. L. 19, 10 A. (2d) 635; Jones v. Bontempo (Ohio
App. 1940) 29 N. E. (2d) 428. Cf. State v. Tarpley (1940) 64 Ohio App.
27, 27 N. E. (2d) 498.
67. Moler v. Whisman (1912) 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 40 L. R. A.(N. S.) 629, Ann. Cas. 1913D 392.
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ing plainly that it is a barber college is valid, since the public
is entitled to know that fact. 68
V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
The agency of administration in forty-five states is a board
of barber examiners having statewide jurisdiction; in Alabama
there is a commission in each county, and in Nevada there are
district boards in addition to a state board; in Washington, the
administrative agency is the Director of Licences, head of one
of the ordinary departments of state administration. In the over-
whelming majority of states these boards have three members
each, although the boards of three states have four each,61 and
four boards have five members each.70 As a rule, also, the mem-
bers of these barber boards are given three-year terms, although
in several states the term of office varies from two to six years, 1
and in a few states the board members serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.7 2 - The appointing authority in the vast
majority of states is the governor, although in a few states the
appointive power is vested in some administrative department,
such as the state health department,73 and in Alabama in the
governing body of the county. The administrative agency in the
District of Columbia is a board of three members appointed by
the Commissioners of the District for three-year terms.
The statutes also specify certain qualifications for member-
ship on the boards. Almost all of them provide that appointees
must have had at least five years' experience in the trade.74 It
has been held that this requirement is not unconstitutional as
constituting a political test for an office or public trust.75 The
68. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 397.
69. Ark., N. J., Okla.
70. Ky., Me., Pa., W. Va.
71. Two years: Ala., Nev. Four years: Cal., Conn., Ky., Md., Miss., No.,
W. Va. Five years: Mich. Six years: Ark., N. C.
72. Idaho, Ill., Pa., Utah.
73. Wis. (state board of health); Idaho (commissioner of department of
law enforcement) ; Ill. (director, department of registration and education);
Utah (director, department of registration); Pa. (department of public in-
struction). In Oklahoma the three barber members of the state board are
appointed by the governor, the medical member by the state health com-
missioner.
74. Idaho requires only one year's experience; West Virginia, eight
years', New Jersey, ten years'. In New Hampshire and the District of
Columbia at least two of the members must be practicing barbers of five
years' experience.
75. State ex tel. Melton v. Nolan (1930) 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. W. (2d)
601.
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Delaware statute provides that the board members must be
"reputable barbers," the Mississippi statute that they must be
of "good moral character," the Minnesota statute that they must
have had an eighth grade education or its equivalent and must
know the subjects taught in approved barber schools, and the
Vermont statute that they have no financial connection with any
cosmetic or barber supply house. The West Virginia law re-
quires that at least one member of the board shall be a member
of the negro race. The Arizona law requires a nonpartisan ap-
pointment, while the statutes of New Mexico and Indiana pro-
vide for nonpartisan appointment but, curiously enough, add that
no more than two shall be appointed from the same political
party. The West Virginia law provides that no more than two
of the four barber members of the board shall belong to the same
party. Three statutes specify a minimum age for the appointee, 6
and several require federal or state citizenship, or residence
within the state for a period of years.77 Several statutes also
specify that the appointees must come from certain areas or
parts of the state, 8 and a few require the appointment of both
journeymen and master barbers.79
Several states now have the very interesting provision that
the appointing authority must select the members of the board
from a list of names presented by barbers' associations or
unions, 0 or that at least he must give "due consideration" to
recommendations by members of the trade.81 The propriety of
consulting private associations in making these appointments
has been challenged but once on constitutional grounds, and has
been sustained, the court suggesting that only the governor is
76. Ga. (21), Ky. (23), Vt. (25).
77. Ky. (citizen of U. S. and of the state); Wyo. (resident citizen of
state) ; Utah (citizen of U. S., resident of state one year) ; Nev. (resident
of state two years) ; Mich. (resident of state five years) ; Ala. (three years
in state, one year in county). Citizen of state three years: Conn., Kan.,
Mo., R. I.
78. Miss. (one from each judicial district); Ore. (one from each con-
gressional district); Ark. (one each from a city of the first and second
classes and an incorporated town); Del. (from Wilmington).
79. Ariz., Colo., Conn., Fla., Mich., Minn., Nev., N. J., N. M., Wis. The
Kentucky statute provides that the board must include a master barber,
a shop owner beautician, a union journeyman barber, an unorganized bar-
ber, and a non-shopowner beautician, and there is a similar provision in
the West Virginia law.
80. Colo., Conn., Minn., N. J., N. D., Wis., Pa., D. C.
81. InI., Utah.
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in a position to object to the method of appointment, and holding
that it does not constitute an unlawful delegation of power.82
This is consistent with the prevailing view in other fields of ad-
ministration. In very many states, the appointing authority must
consult private associations in selecting members of medical,
dental, pharmacy, nursing and other professional boards, 83 and
the great weight of judicial authority has been to the effect that
such consultation does not violate constitutional principles."
The members of most state barber boards are paid per diem,
the compensation being generally fixed by statute at $5 or $10
a day, plus expenses, or at some figure between these two.8 '
Some statutes also provide that one of the board members shall
receive a fixed or larger salary for acting as secretary." In a
few states, all the members of the board work full time, and
are paid regular annual salaries8 * A majority of the states also
provide that all expenses of the barber board must be met from
the fees which it collects. It has been held that such an arrange-
ment does not violate a constitutional provision requiring that
all money received by the state from any source shall go into
the treasury of the state, for the fees of the board are not state
revenue, strictly speaking.88 Furthermore, a general appropria-
tion of 90% of the fees collected by the board is consistent with
a constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out except
in pursuance of an appropriation by law which shall specify the
sum appropriated, the court holding that the legislators set the
sum aside in clear and unequivocal terms, fixed the salary of
82. Ex parte Lucas (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 219.
83. See: Lancaster, Private Associations and Public Administration
(1934) 13 Soc. Forces 285; Lancaster, The Legal Status of 'Private' Cor-
porations Exercising Governmental Powers (1935) 15 Southwest. Soc. Sci.
Q. 325; Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev.
201; Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 80.
84. In re Bulger (1873) 45 Cal. 553 (fire commissioners); Ex parte
Gerino (1904) 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166 (medical board); McCurdy v.
Jessup (1915) 126 Md. 318, 95 Atl. 37 (game wardens); Bradley v. Board
of Zoning Adjustment (1926) 255 Mass. 160, 150 N. E. 892 (zoning board);
Sturgis v. Spofford (1871) 45 N. Y. 446 (licensing of pilots) ; State ex rel.
Smith v. Finger (1891) 48 Ohio St. 505, 28 N. E. 135 (election board);
State Board v. Bellinger (S. Ct. 1910) 122 N. Y. S. 651 (pharmacy board).
85. But in Vermont the compensation per diem is $4, in Pennsylvania,$15.
86. E. g., Ore. ($200 a month) ; Okla. ($1800 per year); Ariz. ($2400
per year); La. ($2500 per year); Minn. ($3000 per year); N. H. ($3000
per year); N. J. ($3000 yer year).
87. E. g., Md., Mass., Cal.
88. Ex parte Lucas (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 219.
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each member of the board at a definite amount, and also required
full itemized reports." On the other hand, a legislative appro-
priation out of the general fund was held invalid in Missouri,
where the barber law required the board to be self-supporting,
the court holding that the appropriation bill did not and could
not amend the general law.90
VI. RULE-MAKING AND THE ISSUE OF DELEGATION
A considerable number of state barber laws include a list of
sanitary regulations, set out in greater or less detail. In addi-
tion, many statutes specifically authorize the barber board to
make reasonable rules and regulations in the administration of
the law, and to prescribe sanitary requirements in addition to
those specified in the law itself."1 A number of statutes provide,
however, that the rules made by the board must have the ap-
proval of the state health department, thus establishing an ad-
ministrative check.92 In several states the health department it-
self makes the rules in the first instance.9 3
An objection often made to such regulatory legislation is that
an abuse of authority is possible if certain things are done which
the legislation theoretically authorizes to be done. It has been
held that the court will not consider the question whether the
statute delegates an arbitrary power to the board to grant or
revoke licenses until the question actually arises.9 4 Similarly,
it has been held that since the delegation of a rule-making power
to administrative officials is not improper, generally speaking,
89. Peters v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1934) 34 P. (2d) 286.
90. State ex rel. Davis v. Smith (1934) 335 Mo. 1069, 75 S. W. (2d)
828.
91. Ariz. Sess. Laws of 1935, 234; Ill. Laws of 1937, 252, sec. 19; Md.
Flack's Supp. Ann. Code (1935) art. 43, sec. 273; Miss. Gen. Laws of
1932, c. 118, sec. 4; N. M. Laws of 1935, 250; Ohio Page's Gen. Code (1937)
see. 1081. Mich. Acts of 1937, No. 307, sec. 3, provides that while the
Board may prescribe minimum standards, none are to pertain to prices,
and that these standards may be established only after notice is given and
a public hearing is held.
92. Me. Laws of 1937, c. 190, sec. 11; Minn. Mason's Stat. (1938 Supp.)
sees. 5846-23; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) sec. 71-2024; N. D. Laws of 1927,
c. 101, sec. 22; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 68-423; R. I. Laws of 1933-34,
c. 2110, sec. 3; S. C. Acts of 1937, No. 223, sec. 16; S. D. Laws of 1931, c.
209, sec. 22; Vt. Laws of 1937, No. 195, sec. 2; W. Va. Acts of 1939, c. 30,
sec. 3.
93. Okla. Laws of 1933, c. 60, see. 6; N. 3. Laws of 1933, c. 175, sec.
22; Tex. Vernon's Ann. Penal Code (1936) Art. 734a, sec. 28.
94. Commonwealth v. Ward (1909) 136 Ky. 146, 123 S. W. 673. Cf.
Baldwyn v. Board of Barber Examiners (1933) 164 Miss. 744, 145 So. 240.
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but is rather "necessary to the vitality" of the law, lack of knowl-
edge as to the classification of diseases by the officials will not
be anticipated2 5 The delegation of a rule-making power to the
board, it is insisted, is a common and well-recognized proce-
dure.9 6 It has been held that while the board may not adopt a
regulation making unlawful an act which the legislature did not
so define, an administrative regulation as to the proper steriliza-
tion of instruments which is exactly the same as a rule set forth
in the statute itself cannot be construed as reflecting an uncon-
stitutional delegation of lawmaking power.9 7 A few years ago,
the Mississippi court held that a statute requiring the applicant
for a license to pass "a satisfactory examination" conducted by
the board, which should include a practical demonstration and a
written and oral test embracing "the subjects usually practised
in a duly licensed shop," did not confer an arbitrary discretion
upon the board.98 The legislature, it was stated, may lay down
the general rule and permit administrative officials to make rea-
sonable rules and regulations to implement it, 9D and it was pointed
out that the conduct of the examination is often left to the judg-
ment of the examining board.100
The whole issue of delegation was thoroughly considered by
the Oregon court some twenty-five years ago when it sustained
one of the early statutes on this subject against the objection
that it did not prescribe the standards or degree of knowledge,
learning and experience a person had to have to receive a license,
such matters having been left to be determined by the board.10 1
Arguing that the weight of authority sustained the delegation
of a broad rule-making power to administrative bodies, the court
said:
The nature and character of the profession, trade, or calling
intended to be licensed or regulated often demands technical
95. Hanzal v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 221 S. W. 237, 239.
96. State ex rel. Melton v. Nolan (1930) 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. W. (2d)
601.
97. Feeman v. State (1936) 131 Ohio St. 85, 1 N. E. (2d) 620.
98. Clark v. State (1934) 169 Miss. 369, 152 So. 820.
99. Citing: Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649; United States v.
Grimaud (1911) 220 U. S. 506; Abbott v. State (1913) 106 Miss. 340, 63
So. 667.
100. Citing: Smith v. Alabama (1888) 124 U. S. 465 (engineers); Dent
v. West Virginia (1889) 129 U. S. 114 (doctors); People ex rel. Nechamcus
v. Warden (1895) 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686, 27 L. R. A. 718 (plumbers).
101. State v. Briggs (1904) 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 2 Ann. Cas. 424.
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knowledge and learning in order to designate accurately the
qualifications which should be possessed by those designing
to follow it. In the nature of things, this is a matter out-
side the ordinary scope of legislative wisdom. The prescrib-
ing of the proper qualifications of applicants for licenses by
some agent of the state, learned in such profession or call-
ing, is not legislation, but rather the exercise of a mere
administrative power. A law, when it comes from the Leg-
islature, must be complete, but there are many matters af-
fecting its execution and relating to methods of procedure,
which the Legislature may properly delegate to some min-
isterial board or officer, and prescribing the qualifications
of persons who shall be licensed to follow or engage in the
practice of a given trade or profession is one of them.
10 2
The board, it was suggested, was authorized to prescribe only
fair and reasonable qualifications; arbitrary or unreasonable ac-
tion by the board would not make the act invalid, as the court
could provide a remedy against such action; the constitutionality
of an act of legislation, the court said, should be determined by
its provisions, and not by the way it is administered.
In a recent decision, however, the Maryland court held that
since the statute embraced a wide variety of subjects, including
hygiene, bacteriology, histology of the hair, skin, nails, muscles
and nerves, elementary chemistry, and the like, the powers of
examination given to the board were "so broad that they may
be exercised in an arbitrary fashion in this almost unlimited field
of requirements."'03 However, this was only one of many rea-
sons which led the court to condemn the statute which was be-
fore it, and on this point, the case seems to stand alone among
the various precedents.
VII. REVOCATION OF LICENSES
One of the important powers in the hands of the administra-
tive boards, and one of their most drastic sanctions, is the power
to revoke the barber's license, for it relates to the very possi-
bility of a livelihood itself. So far as the power of revocation
is concerned, the statutes generally contain two types of provi-
sions. First of all, they set forth in fairly precise terms the rea-
sons for which licenses may be revoked, and secondly, most of
them provide for the procedure to be followed.
102. Id., 77 Pac. at 752.
103. Schneider v. Duer (Md. 1936) 184 At. 914, 918.
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There are many and varied grounds for revocation in the ex-
isting legislation. In twenty-seven states the license may be re-
voked for the commission of any felony; in five states any
"crime" is sufficient; in Iowa and Washington, offenses "involv-
ing turpitude" may lead to a revocation. In thirty-three states
habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs is a cause for revoca-
tion, while in six other states drunkenness alone is mentioned.
In eight states the license may be revoked for "malpractice," and
in nineteen states for "gross malpractice." "Incompetence" is a
sufficient cause in eight states, while in thirty states there must
be "gross incompetence." Forty-one states specifically authorize
revocation if the barber acquires some kind of a communicable
disease. Twenty-seven statutes permit revocation for false or
misleading advertising, and sixteen for the use of a competitor's
trade name. Some twenty-five states authorize revocation for the
violation of sanitary regulations, though the precise language
varies somewhat in various statutes.0 4 Seven states also provide
that the maintenance of unclean or unsanitary conditions is a
sufficient ground for withdrawing a license. Twenty-one states
have the rather remarkable provision in their laws that licenses
of barbers may be revoked for "immoral or unprofessional con-
duct." There are similar standards in other states: "immoral or
unethical conduct" in Louisiana, "immoral, unprofessional or dis-
honorable conduct" in Iowa, "unethical or dishonest practice or
conduct" in Pennsylvania, and "immoral conduct" in Texas.
Most of the statutes, in addition to enumerating the reasons
which may be made a cause of revocation, also have some pro-
visions with respect to the procedure to be followed. The laws
of forty states specifically provide for notice and a public hear-
ing before the license can be revoked. Furthermore, most of
these laws specify the number of days of notice to which the
barber is entitled before the hearing is held: in twenty-one states
there must be twenty days' notice; two states provide for fifteen
days' notice, five states for ten days' notice, and in ten states
five days' notice suffices. Ten statutes stipulate that the barber
is entitled to counsel at these hearings, though of course such a
provision is unnecessary. The District of Columbia act simply
states that the barber is entitled to notice and a full hearing.
104. For example, the New Jersey law permits revocation only in case
of "repeated violation of sanitary rules." The Indiana statute permits
revocation for violation of any city ordinance.
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A few statutes specify that the barber whose license has been
revoked has a right of judicial appeal,105 and some also specify
the particular court to which an appeal may be taken.06 Eight
statutes also indicate that the appeal must be taken within a
specified number of days, the number varying from ten to
thirty. °'" The statutes of Alabama, Montana and Oregon provide
that the question is to be tried in court de novo. The Illinois
statute indicates that the court may review all questions of law
and fact. Ohio provides for judicial review if the administra-
tive finding is "unreasonable or unlawful." In Illinois, the Direc-
tor of the Department of Registration and Education, and in
Idaho the Commissioner of the Department of Law Enforcement,
may order a rehearing if satisfied that "substantial justice has
not been done." In the District of Columbia an appeal may be
taken to the District Court, subject to review by the Court of
Appeals. Of course, one may try his luck in court, under general
rules of law and practice, whether the statute mentions the right
of judicial appeal or not.1' 8
In spite of the seriousness of a revocation of license, there have
been only a few cases on the subject in the appellate courts of the
states. One reason may be the newness of the statutes. Another
reason may be the reluctance with which barber boards have
exercised this power, for, meagre as the evidence is, since board
reports are rarely published, it is clear that they have proceeded
most cautiously in revoking licenses. 10 Still another reason may
105. Ind., Ky., Ohio.
106. Ala. (county circuit court), Ariz. (superior court of county), Ark.
(circuit court of the district and supreme court), Conn. (superior court
for Hartford County), Ill. (circuit and superior courts, supreme court),
Md. (circuit courts of the county or common law courts of Baltimore), N. C.(superior court), Ore. (circuit court), R. I. (supreme court), Tex. (dis-
trict courts of Travis County), Mont. (district courts).
107. Ten days: Conn., Mont. Twenty days: Ill., Tex. Thirty days: Ala.,
Ariz., Ore., R. I.
108. It has been held that it is not necessary for a city commission to
indicate in an ordinance that the individual has a right of appeal to the
courts, nor is it necessary to instruct him how to proceed in case he wants
to go to court, since he already has adequate recourse to the courts. Hanzal
v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 221 S. W. 237.
109. E. g., since January 1928, the Nebraska Board has revoked only
twelve licenses: one for disease, five for unprofessional conduct, and sLx
for making false statements in the application. During the year ending
June 30, 1938, the Connecticut Board revoked sixteen licenses. (April 1939)
35 The Journeyman Barber 22. Pennsylvania reported forty-five revoca-
tions during 1937. (Feb. 1938) 34 The Journeyman Barber 24. There are
about 25,000 barbers in Pennsylvania.
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lie in the fact that notwithstanding the persistent protestations
of the barbers' associations, this is a rather simple and mechani-
cal trade the standards of which are not too difficult to maintain.
The court decisions on this subject suggest rather typical prop-
ositions of law. It has been ruled that the barber board is not
a judicial tribunal, its duties being administrative and minis-
terial, and that therefore, a writ of prohibition will not lie against
the board in performing its duty of revoking licenses for un-
sanitary practices and gross incompetence.11o Nor will a court
enjoin the making of an inquiry by the board to determine the
question of revocation 11 Where a statute gives the barber a
right of appeal to the courts, there is no denial of due process
of law."1 2 Furthermore, the revocation is not a criminal proceed-
ing, and on a statutory appeal from the order of an admin-
istrative board the appellant is not entitled to a trial de novo,
the burden of proof resting upon the person attacking the order,
which, "if not void on its face," is presumptively valid. 1 3 Simi-
larly, a statute authorizing the board to revoke a license, sub-
ject to judicial review, does not violate a constitutional provision
requiring a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions, since this is
not a criminal prosecution, there being no penalty or punishment
except the revocation of the license.14 A provision authorizing a
member of the board to enter and make a reasonable examina-
tion of any barber shop to ascertain its sanitary condition is not
an unreasonable search or seizure, since nothing is taken or
broken; it is merely an examination to help the board determine
the question of revocation."15
A license may be revoked for doing unsanitary and filthy
work,1l6 and this applies to barbers who were practicing the
trade before the act went into effect and were therefore given
licenses without examination, since the distinction made between
those who had to take examinations and those who were exempt
did not contemplate exempting the latter from the provisions of
110. State ex rel. Allen v. Davis (Mo. App. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 844.
111. State Board v. Comer (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 1012.
112. Turner v. Bennett (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 967.
113. Lackey v. Board (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 113 S. W. (2d) 968.
114. State v. Armeno (1909) 29 R. I. 431, 72 Atl. 216.
115. Ibid.
116. State Board v. Comer (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 1012,
followed in State Board v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d)
1013.
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the law with respect to revocation."? A statute which authorizes
a revocation for "gross malpractice" is not void for uncertainty,
and to apply the term to certain unsanitary practices, such as
failure to sterilize instruments, is not unreasonable or arbitrary,
especially in view of the fact that another section of the- law
makes such practices misdemeanors. 1 8 A statute which, according
to its title, is designed "to ensure the proper sanitary conditions
in barber shops, and prevent the spreading of disease," and
which requires a doctor's certificate from every applicant for a
license, is broad enough to permit the board, within its general
rule-making power, to revoke a license because of disease."19
Furthermore, the cancellation of a barber school's permit be-
cause of the use of towels a second time was held valid, where
the statute required schools to teach the "scientific fundamentals
of barbering," specifically provided that no barber should use
the same towel on two customers, and authorized the cancellation
of licenses for violations of "any requirements of the law."'120
In a very few instances, the courts have taken an adverse view
of the revocation provisions of barber laws. In 1936, the Mary-
land court, in an exhaustive review of the state law, held that
the grant of the power of revocation to the board for the com-
mission of any crime was "entirely too general and too broad."' 21
The court asserted:
It has very little, if any, relation to the health feature, and,
in addition to the penalty that the criminal law imposes, that
of depriving one of his trade or calling, however insignifi-
cant the crime may be, reposes unreasonable powers in the
board that may be arbitrarily exercised and should not be
tolerated. A man who has endured his punishment should
not thereafter be deprived of his livelihood and thrown back
upon society as a possible derelict and charge, unable to ob-
tain employment because of an unreasonable intervention
of the state.l""
The court also held that the provision authorizing revocation for
having any communicable disease falls under the same constitu-
tional inhibition, arguing that the statute ignores the question
117. State v. Chaney (1904) 36 Wash. 350, 78 Pac. 915.
118. Turner v. Bennett (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 967.
119. Eason v. Morrison (1935) 181 Ga. 322, 182 S. E. 163.
120. Dendy v. Dartez (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 264.
121. Schneider v. Duer (Md. 1936) 184 Atl 914.
122. Id. at 920.
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of the severity of the contagion, for even a common cold could
thus be made the reason for depriving a man of his livelihood. 123
Similarly, a statutory provision authorizing the administrative
body to revoke the license of a barber school whenever, in its
judgment, the school is not financially able to carry out its con-
tracts of instruction, "uncontrolled by any standard or rule or
provision for review," has been held to be in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and an improper delegation of power.124
Finally, it is to be noted that a barber board may revoke a license
only for the reasons set forth in the statute, and where a board
revoked a license because of alleged unsanitary practices, when
the real reason was the refusal of the barber in question to raise
his prices, the court allowed actual and exemplary damages in
a suit for conspiracy.125 The court held that the fact that the
board is a creature of statute charged with making and enforc-
ing rules and regulations, does not mean that it has the power
to force a barber into line as to prices, and to "adopt measures
which, although performed under the forms of law, are con-
ceived in iniquity, and be relieved from the consequences flowing
from their unlawful acts."'1 26
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Maryland recently suggested a general
method of approach in dealing, with the sort of legislation which
has been the subject of investigation in this study:
Acts creating boards or commissions, with numerous offi-
cials and paid employees, complicated legal machinery, and
elaborate plans for the supposed purpose of regulating sim-
ple trades and callings, well known and understood by the
public, the expenses of which come out of the pockets or
earnings of those engaged in the trade, should be viewed
with care and examined with diligence to ascertain whether
such acts and regulatory measures are designed to safeguard
the public welfare, or for other purposes not sanctioned by
law.1 27
This is a sound observation, and if one views with care and
examines with diligence, it is clear that there is much in current
123. Id. at 920.
124. Marx v. Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 397.
125. Stoner v. Wilson (1934) 140 Kan. 383, 36 P. (2d) 999.
126. Id., 36 P. (2d) at 1006.
127. Schneider v. Duer (Md. 1936) 184 At]. 914, 917.
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barbering legislation that has little to do with the public welfare.
It is apparent that the driving force behind the new and growing
body of legislation is found in the organized barbers' associations,
and that such legislation, often poorly drafted,1 2 is an expres-
sion of a variety of purposes.
Perhaps the all-embracing purpose of this legislation may be
said to be the attainment of a professional status. 29 Barbers
are at the present time listed by the Census Bureau under the
heading of "Domestic and Personal Service, '1130 and it is a com-
mentary upon the legislative aims of the barber associations that
one of their major preoccupations, judging from the content of
their current literature, is to attain the heights of a professional
classification. One state association leader says:
We are not laboring people. Our work requires a certain
learned knowledge, and is requiring more all the time. We
must be skillful in certain movements and manipulations of
the hands and fingers. It requires a certain skillful tech-
nique in the use of delicate tools, instruments and appli-
ances. It requires adaptation and co-ordination of eye and
brain, nerve and muscle. We are not laboring people, we are
building a profession. 31
And so we are assured by the editor of a barber magazine that
"humanity entrusts its outer appearance, from the neck up, to
the ministrations of the barber and beautician."' 32 The barber
shop has become streamlined, we are told, and barbering has
128. Compare the remarks of Campbell, J., in Curran v. Bowell (1928)
53 S. D. 92, 95, 220 N. W. 455, 457: "The statute is crudely and inartis-
tically drawn, and is so full of inconsistencies and self-contradictions that
to go to any particular phrase or clause or section and seek thereby to dis-
cern definitely and specifically that more or less chimerical thing commonly
denominated as 'legislative intent' seems utterly hopeless. The act, we are
told, originated with the Barbers' Association of the state, and in view of
the numerous inconsistencies appearing therein about the only thing that
can legitimately be said as to the 'legislative intent' seems to be this, that
the various members of the Legislature were apparently quite willing to
give the barbers whatever regulation of barbers and barbering they may
have supposed the barbers themselves thought they would get by virtue of
the terms of the act."
129. "There is an apparent design, although indefensible and unreason-
able, to give to this simple and useful trade the characteristics and standards
of a highly technical profession, surrounded with requirements, grades, and
divisions such as one might expect to find in those professions where life,
liberty, and property are of everyday concernment." Schneider v. Duer (Md.
1936) 184 Atl. 914, 918.
130. Index of Occupatians (1937) 30.
131. (April 1939) 19 Master Barber Mag. 7.
132. (Jan. 1939) 18 Master Barber Mag. 4.
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become one of the professional callings.133 Over and over again,
writers in the barber journals return to this theme.134 There
also seems to be some nostalgic pointing with pride to ancient
days when barbers were also surgeons, or surgeon barbers, and
appeal is therefore made to history.1" 5 Barbering is, of course,
an ancient trade,""' but this is not a conclusive fact, for age
alone cannot impress upon a common calling the characteristic
features of a profession. After all, many trades to which no one
would ascribe a professional status are quite as old. Nor can a
common trade be converted into a profession by legal fiat, even
though it is clothed by law with the outward manifestations of
one, for the skill, learning, occupational and ethical standards
that stamp a particular calling a profession are indigenous qual-
ities which have an objective reality, independently of the law,
and indeed are in fact antecedent to legislation. One should not
be misled by the imposing array of scientific subjects concerning
which applicants for barbers' licenses are examined, for the body
of knowledge required of them is really most elementary. 3
A legitimate purpose of barber legislation is the protection of
the public health and safety. This has long been recognized as
a proper objective of police power legislation, and the licensing
device has long been used as a sanction in very many different
133. See: Holtzman and Stechel, Science is Streamlining Tony the Bar-
ber (Feb. 1939) 27 Nation's Business 24; Fishbein, The Cult of Beauty(1926) 7 American Mercury 161; The Male Face (May 1937) 15 Fortune
125; Sullivan, Figaro Storms Athens (1929) 18 American Mercury 441.
134. See Greene, Why Barbers Merit Professional Classification (Oct.
1937) 17 Master Barber Mag. 14. See also: Journeyman Barber for Nov.
1939, 26; Dec. 1938, 32; Jan. 1939, 28; Master Barber Mag. for Aug. 1938,
7; Jan. 1939, 6; Feb. 1939, 13.
135. See (April 1939) 19 Master Barber Mag. 18; (April 1939) 35
Journeyman Barber 28.
136. "Anciently the craft of barbering was dignified as a profession and
conjoined with the art of surgery * * *. It was practiced in oriental coun-
tries * * *. During the reign of Edward IV of England, the barbers were
incorporated by law; and by 32 Henry VIII (C) 42, were united with the
surgeons, but their activities were limited to minor operations of blood
letting and extracting teeth and hair clipping and shaving. In 1745 the
barbers and surgeons were each separated into a distinct corporation by
18 George II, c. 15. The barber's pole with the spiral red is said to sym-
bolize the winding of a ribbon around the arm previous to letting blood.
The craft of barbering has been dignified for many centuries by public
notice and legislative enactment granting and limiting power." Marx v.
Maybury (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 397, 398.
137. All the facts concerning both the theoretical and practical aspects
of barbering are found within the compass of a short elementary book of
300 pages, the Associated Master Barbers of America, Standardized Text-
book of Barbering (Rev. ed. 1936).
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fields of endeavor.138 But this does not mean that any and every
calling may be subjected to a licensing system of control,139 nor
that a calling susceptible to such control may thereafter be put
under any restraints the legislature may see fit or be driven to
impose. Indeed, it has been asserted that the modern general
barber law represents "perhaps the farthest point reached by the
tide of regulation of labor and industry.""4
Thus, one may question the legitimacy of those features of the
existing barber laws which are designed to restrict unduly the
opportunities of entering the trade, and to control price and ser-
vice competition within it. The tendency of various small busi-
nesses to seek monopolistic privileges from the legislature is
widespread today,41' and it should be strenuously resisted if we
propose to maintain a competitive economic system and to avoid
the creation of new rigidities in it.142 The impetus for price-
138. See: Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property
(1928) 7; White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (Rev.
ed. 1939) c. 32; Crecraft, Government and Business (1928) c. 30; Powell,
Administrative Exercise of the Police Power (1910-1911) 24 Harv. L. Rev.
268, 333, 441; Freund, Licensing (1933) 9 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 447; Ludwig,
Administration of Regulatory Licenses (1938) 20 Pub. Man. 227; Koons,
Growth of Federal Licensing (1936) 24 Geo. Law J. 293; Johnson and
Kessler, The Liquor License System (1937-1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
210, 380; Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing
Statutes (1938) 17 N. C. L. Rev. 1; Note (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 472; Note
(1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 219.
139. For example, licensing laws have been held invalid for land sur-
veyors, Doe v. Jones (1927) 327 Ill. 387, 158 N. E. 703; paper-hangers,
Dasch v. Jackson (1936) 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534; bricklayers, Wilson v.
District of Columbia (1905) 26 App. D. C. 110; horseshoers, Bessette v.
People (1901) 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215, In re Aubrey (1904) 36 Wash.
308, 78 Pac. 900; photographers, Wright v. Wiles (Tenn. 1938) 117 S. W.
(2d) 736, Territory v. Kraft (1935) 33 Hawaii 397; cement contractors,
State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan (1918) 25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. 1; and
heating contractors, Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton (1923) 224 Mich. 564,
195 N. W. 60.
140. Dasch v. Jackson (1936) 170 Md. 251, 266, 183 Atl. 534, 540.
141. See Note, Legislative Monopolies Achieved by Small Business (1939)
48 Yale L. J. 847. Cf. Grether, Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in
Relation to the Control of Price Competition (1937) 4 Law and Contemp.
Prob. 375.
142. See the remarks of Barnhill, J., dissenting in State v. Lawrence
(1938) 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586, 593: "Almost every trade and calling
is tinged with some element of social interest or public service, for if
the work has no social utility it rarely survives. However, few trades or
callings are so essentially vested with a social interest as to justify their
establishment, by legislative grant, as close-knit, self-governing, trade mo-
nopolies having the power to exclude those seeking to compete with veterans
of the craft. The life of our society is not yet so thoroughly regimented
that the right to work and earn an honest living in the trade of one's choice
is dependent upon the approval of some bureau, commission, or examining
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fixing legislation obviously comes from the barbers' associations,
whose journals constantly urge its necessity and justice and hail
with delight each new victory.143 In fact, a great deal of price
control is accomplished by barbers' associations through measures
of self-help without resort to the sanctions of the law. The gen-
eral president of the Journeymen Barbers' International Union
recently asserted that his association has for fifty years, through
its local unions, "assumed the responsibility of fixing and con-
tinuing stable prices.' 144 This is accomplished through fines, sus-
pension from the locals, or annulment of membership cards. And
thus self-government in business rears its ugly head.
board, itself interested perhaps in excluding new workers from its own
crowded vineyard." Cf. the remarks of Brown, J., in Moler v. Whisman(1912) 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 989: "Possibly some barbers like some
lawyers and other persons who have attained successful and remunerative
positions in professional and commercial life become anxious to shut out
competition by 'burning the bridges behind them', so to speak, but such a
scheme is entirely un-American because it is the policy of a free common-
wealth to encourage thrift and industry among its citizens and to keep the
door of opportunity ajar so that every qualified and deserving person who
so desires may enter thereat." See also the interesting veto message of
Gov. R. L. Cochran of Nebraska, Legislative Journal, 53d Sess. (1939)
1185-1187.
143. See: Master Barber Mag. for Sept. 1938, 8; Nov. 1938, 5, 17, 32;
Dec. 1938, 10, 19; Feb. 1939, 8, 10, 32; March 1939, 5, 19; April 1939,
5,19; 35 Journeyman Barber 4; July 1938, 11; Sept. 1938, 30; Oct. 1938, 16;Dec. 1938, 11. See (Jan. 1939) 34 Journeyman Barber 22, for a proposed
model bill on price-fixing.
144. (May, 1938) 34 Journeyman Barber 11. For an analysis of eco-
nomic conditions of the trade, see Working Conditions and Wages in Union
Barber Shops, 1938 (1939) 48 Monthly Lab. Rev. 1287.
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